Here is the introductory part of an essay by Brian Earp on the subject of respect and how what we define as respect affects our ability or otherwise to discuss certain things properly. I have broken off the quotation from the essay at the point where he begins to talk about male circulmcision as practised by religious groups, but the link is to the whole paper, as yet in draft form.
blog.practicalethics.ox.ac.uk/2012/10/religious-vs-secular-ethics-and-a-note-about-respect/
By Brian Earp
This is a rough draft of a lecture delivered on October 1st, 2012, at the 12th Annual International Symposium on Law, Genital Autonomy, and Children’s Rights (Helsinki, Finland). It will appear in a substantially revised form—as a completed paper—at a later date. If you quote or use any part of this post, please include the following citation and notice:
Earp, B. D. (forthcoming, pre-publication draft). Assessing a religious practice from secular-ethical grounds: Competing metaphysics in the circumcision debate, and a note about discursive respect. To appear in G. C. Denniston, F. M. Hodges, & M. F. Milos (Eds.), Proceedings of the 12th Annual International Symposium on Law, Genital Autonomy, and Children’s Rights, published by Springer. * Note, this is not the finished version of this document, and changes may be made before final publication.
* * * * * *
Hello,
My name is Brian Earp; I am a Research Associate in the philosophy department at the University of Oxford, and I conduct research in practical ethics and medical ethics, among some other topics. As you saw from the program, my topic today is the ethics of infant male circumcision—specifically as it is performed for religious reasons.
I should begin by saying that in debates on this topic, I’ve noticed that there is sometimes a very serious reluctance to address the issue of religious motivation directly. And this is true even among those who are otherwise outspoken in their opposition to circumcision on other grounds. For example, in 2007, Harry Meislahn of the Illinois chapter of NOCIRC—a prominent anti-circumcision organization—was asked if he would argue that Jews should discontinue circumcising their babies, along with secular or Christian parents who might be doing it out of cultural habit or because they thought it might be good for the baby’s health. He replied: “No. I don’t prescribe for Jews, at all. This is an absolute loser. I’m not Jewish. … I withdraw from this field because it generates lots of heat [and] very little light”[1] (quoted in Ungar-Sargon, 2007).
(He went on to say, however: “I would maintain that a Jewish baby feels pain just as a non-Jewish baby feels pain, and there are Jewish men, just like non-Jewish men, who are real angry that this was done to them.”)
The philosopher Iain Brassington has recently expressed a similar concern. On the Journal of Medical Ethics blog, he wrote: “Though I [have] mentioned the [recent] decision of the German court that ritual circumcision constituted assault, I’ve wanted to stay clear of saying more about it [because] it seemed too potentially toxic”[2] (Brassington, 2012, para. 2). To give another example, the bioethicist Dan O’Connor from Johns Hopkins University—in an article entitled “A Piece I Really Didn’t Want to Write on Circumcision”—has recently said that: “when [a reporter] calls my work and ask[s] if there is a bioethicist in the house who will give the anti-circumcision viewpoint, I beg off. … I would be a terrible interviewee anyway, [since I would have to preface] my every argument against circumcision with rambling spiels about what loving and caring parents my [Jewish] friends are” (O’Connor, 2012, para. 10).
Finally, as a philosopher colleague of mine wrote to me in a recent email: “To be honest with you, I am strongly anti-circumcision. The reason I don’t [write papers on the topic] is that I have a large number of circumcised Jewish … friends who I think would be offended if they found out [about my views]” (personal communication, May 17, 2012).
Like all of the men I have just mentioned, I find myself in the position of being very skeptical about ritual circumcision on ethical grounds—for reasons I will give in just a moment—and yet I am well aware that since I myself am neither Jewish nor Muslim, I have an especially good chance of offending someone who is when I publically criticize this practice. This chance is, of course, magnified by the fact that circumcision is seen by some as a central, or even obligatory, ritual in each of these faiths. And just like the bioethicist Dan O’Connor and the philosopher colleague whose email I quoted above, this potential for causing offense extends to many of my closest friends, to colleagues of mine, and to a pretty wide range of people I have no particular interest in irritating.
So perhaps there is a reason to hesitate. Because religious convictions are a deep, and certainly emotionally-charged, aspect of the lives of so many, attempts to question a religiously-motivated practice—especially by one who is not religious, or differently religious—can lead to outcomes that are very far from productive. To illustrate, here is a quote from a comment I received on my Facebook page in response to a post I published on this topic in 2011:
Sorry Brian, you’re entitled to your non-Jewish opinion, but we’ve been doing very nicely for 5,771 years with this ancient tradition of our people. And I don’t even know who the hell you are, but this kind of nonsense just pisses me off. (Quoted in Earp, 2011)
So, as I say, sometimes the conversation doesn’t turn out to be as productive as I’d hoped. Part of what I think is going on here, is that we have an unwritten rule in polite society that says that certain ideas or practices are out of bounds for critical discussion. The English humorist Douglas Adams made essentially this same point in a speech he gave in Cambridge in 1998. Talking about religious customs specifically, he said:
‘Here is an idea or a notion that you’re not allowed to say anything bad about; you’re just not. Why not? — because you’re not!’ If somebody votes for a party that you don’t agree with, you’re free to argue about it as much as you like; everybody will have an argument but nobody feels aggrieved by it. If somebody thinks taxes should go up or down you are free to have an argument about [that], but on the other hand if somebody says ‘I mustn’t move a light switch on a Saturday’, you say, ‘Fine, I respect that’. (Adams, 1998)
Now, obviously I don’t have any arguments about whether or when it’s OK to use a light switch. I do want to focus, though, for a second on this idea about respect. I don’t think it actually is showing respect to anyone to give an automatic pass to anything they say or do just because it might have to do with their religious practice. I think that sort of avoidance has much more to do with fear than with respect—fear that you might upset the person, or fear that you might sound stupid for not knowing more about the custom, or fear that the conversation might turn out to be awkward, or whatever the fear might be.
Respect, it seems to me, is very different from this. Respect has to do with taking certain positive things for granted. In my own experience, for example, I sometimes talk with my Jewish friends and acquaintances about my views on the ethics of circumcision. And I respect them enough to know that they’ll listen with an open mind, really consider what I’m saying, and assume the best of intentions on my part. And most of the time, they respect me enough to know that I will do them the same courtesy, which, of course, I will. Respect is not about avoidance, then. It is about the opposite of avoidance—it is about engagement, conversation, communication—so long as these are done in a fair-minded and well-intended way.
I also think that there is something potentially very condescending about the idea that someone’s feelings—religious or otherwise—might be so fragile and irrational that instead of just saying what you really believe, and having an honest conversation about it, you should tiptoe around, and blush, and make excuses, and pretend that you don’t mean what you mean or think what you think. That doesn’t seem like real respect either—and I think my religious friends would be rightly insulted if they thought I was operating out of this mindset when I talked with them about their beliefs and practices.
So, having said all that, in what follows, I am simply going to trust that I can engage directly with the ethical arguments for and against religiously-motivated circumcision, without having to hedge or qualify, or worry about whether I might offend someone for whom this practice is seen as being too sacred to talk about. People are free to disagree with me, of course, and I will be happy to take on board any constructive criticism they may have to offer. But I do want to spend the rest of my time dealing directly with the arguments.
I will start with an argument against religiously-motivated circumcision, and then I will consider some common objections.
I do appreciate what you were saying. Trying to force a Jew to eat black pudding would be like making Brits eat dog, so deeply entrenched are cultural prejudices.
Hi absent I had not misunderstood the debate & I understood the legal bit re slavery. But my point is that as slavery was not linked to a personal religious belief in the same way that circumcision / equality of women etc it may not be as easily resolved!
My reference to food laws was to illustrate how deeply these customs have a hold on an individual's perception of self.
I think we are broadly in agreement.
nanaej I think the reference to slavery was to give an example of a traditional legal practice that was brought to an end by people talking about a different point of view.
However, I am in full agreement with your point that individual believers often feel personally attacked when there is discussion about the ethics of their religious practices. Archaic religious constraints about meals are really of no concern to anyone except an orthodox believer who wishes to follow them. However, the related religious constraints about methods of slaughter are a legitimate cause for discussion.
Similarly, I would agree with you that customs contravening human rights are legitimate subjects for discussion but there are those who believe that these customs are direct instructions from their god and their god's law trumps any human inventions. This is where it becomes extremely difficult to raise some of the topics you have mentioned without offending and, indeed, arousing anger in people with that kind of faith.
Consequently, people who should be leading discussions on these issues often fall back on the tired old excuse of respecting other people's faiths and beliefs.
I think the difference with slavery and traditional religious practices is that, rightly or wrongly, the individual believer feels that they are being attacked and threatened. I would support the right of individuals to be able to worship & hold religious beliefs. The delicate path is where religious practice is seen to contravene a basic human right.
To a non-faith person many of the food rules of Jews / Muslims can be seen as an outdated set of rules to keep a community safe from food poisoning in a hot climate pre-refrigeration. However even secular Jews & Muslims find it hard to eat pork as it is so deep in their religious/cultural psyche even now when it is safer to do so! It is this deeply ingrained 'belief/practice' that is harder to have any rational debate about!
Religious practice/custom that many feel contravene human rights (e.g regarding circumcision, role of women, homosexuality etc) need to be debated openly and be argued on a 'rights' basis. I think many religious leaders..of any major faith.. will find it hard to support the 'out-lawing' of religious customs/practises because they will know that within their own faith there will be practices that might also be contravening human rights.
Slavery was traditonal. People who thought it was wrong spoke out about it. Others realised the rightness of a change. Change came.
Anyone shall discuss it. Views will be aired. MPs will be spoken to. Laws will be changed. Democracy in action.
Discussing problems openly helps people to understand the problems and to use their innate moral sense to decide what is right. Even if laws are not changed, individuals can decide to do or not do something that, without open discussion, they might have just gone along with because it was tradition and they were brought up to believe that honouring tradition is good for its own sake. Open discussion means that they have a choice to say maybe this tradition is not good; I will abandon it.
'if an issue is an ethical one and there is a question of a basic human right not being honoured because of some ancient tradition, then the issue must be discussed ' Bags
Who shall discuss it and how will change be brought about?
How shall we here proceed?
I have tried to read his essay but the brain just isnt' in gear today. All I can think is what parents with the surname Earp inflict on their son a first name with the initial B?
B.Earp?
I think I missed some of the subtlety of your post, daman. Apologies. You said "trying" to hold in high esteem.
Surely it is by questioning accepted practice that laws are introduced or amended. A relatively uncontroversial example (unrelated to religion) would be the change in rape laws to recognise rape within marriage.
As for legality – legality doesn't make something right. Laws can be changed into better laws.
There are some things I don't hold in high esteem and I'd be ashamed to pretend that I did. Not suggesting you are pretending, daman, but I would be if I said that. I abhor the practice. I think it is barbaric.
I am not sure we can take this far, because as long as a practice is legal then it is only 'their values against mine'
I think my statement today would be:
"I am trying to hold your practice in high esteem while also trying to balance it against my personal ethics and my personal beliefs on human rights."
To return to an old quote, " For evil to triumph it is necessary only that good men do nothing"
Those who define a specific religion or culture by one aspect of it do become very defensive when that aspect is exposed to general scrutiny and criticised.
Quite. And given the recent story about poor Malala, is it surprising? However, I would feel that I wasn't doing my duty if I gave in to such pressure and shied away from raising the issues of free speech and respect and arguing about what they actually mean and entail for society. It is sad that some people expect a civilised society to 'tolerate' abuses of human rights. Not tolerating wrongdoing is not intolerance; it is seeking for justice.
It's always a problem when a practice is entrenched because mere discussion about the specific practice is almost always seen as criticism of the entire culture or religion (sometimes both). Thus debating the ethics of performing medically unnecessary surgery on baby boys is casually classed as anti-semitic or anti Muslim. Consequently, people are very timid about even suggesting such an issue is debatable because they fear unreasonable over-reaction.
And he's probably got a grant to enable to him to do it too. That in itself is encouraging in that it would suggest that not everyone thinks taboos are impregnable to rational discussion, nor should be.
There seems to be quite a widespread feeling that religious beliefs are in some way exceptional so that although it is regarded as acceptable to comment on, say, political or philosophical beliefs, it is not acceptable to comment on religious beliefs and their concomitant practices. The only other area in which this exceptional condition exists to some extent is so-called cultural practices. I think Brian Earp was spot on when he suggested that this is the result of fear of offending rather than out of respect. That only now the forces of law are beginning to act against forced (not arranged) marriage is an indication of this long-standing attitude regarding cultural practices. I think that discussing an ethical issue, whether forced marriage or forced surgery, should not be restricted because the issue is closely tied to cultural or religious beliefs and practices. I think he is quite brave to put his head above the parapet, but then as a researcher in practical and medical ethics, that is exactly what he should do.
I would like to but can't cope with this minute tablet thingy......being away......buut very interesting this concept Of respect..............
Sorry. Not philosophical when I've just spent two hours reading one of the six cases I'm hearing today.
Good morning all.
to you all. I'm off to foreign parts today, well Wales anyway.
Looking forward to tomorrow when DGD is coming to visit ( I think she's bringing mummy and daddy with her to drive her as she's only 16 months old)
In short, I was hoping for a philosophical discussion, but if no-one else wants it, so be it, I shrug and move on.
daman, I thought it would be interesting to discuss the issue of respect. It gets mentioned now and again on gransnet. I came across Earp's essay (via Twitter, as it happens) and thought he approached the subject well. No, I'm not his representative. He is his own representative. As I said, I like his approach so I thought it would be a good introduction. Most people's take on 'respect' seems to be: you can't say that because someone may take offence.
If no-one wants to have a discussion about respect and free speech, that's fine; the thread will just slip off the bottom of the 'Active' page in due course.
Bags I dont think you went to this trouble of putting the talk on Gransnet for flippancy. I believe your last paragraph (from: I think...) to be stating your position - is this so?
We cant have a debate with Mr Earp because he is not here, so you are his representative - yes?
You are one person and you have your own ethics. What are you putting to us reference Mr Earp's piece?
I've re-read the extract I posted on here and in the light of that re-reading, yes, in answer to you question earlier, I do think you have misread what he is saying, jeni. At least, I don't see the meaning in it that you suggest: to say what you like and never mind what others think. I still think that's an over-simplistic interpretation.
Please explain where you think I have circumlocuted, as I don't understand how I've done that. I think he is saying that if an issue is an ethical one and there is a question of a basic human right not being honoured because of some ancient tradition, then the issue must be discussed and the rights of the individuals affected by the traditions must be considered. That's not dismissive, in my view, unlike "never minding what others think".
Meanwhile I'll read the extract again.
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